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Abstract
The majority of Acholi recognize that most combatants in the Lord ' s Resistance Army
(LRA) were fo rcibly abducted and have themselves been victims. This creates a moral
empathy with the perpetrators and an acknow ledgement that the formal justice system is
not sufficiently nuanced to make the necessary distinctions between legal and moral gu ilt.
This has generated a remarkable commitment to reconciliation and a peacefu l settlement
of the conflict rather than calling for retribution against the perpetrators of serious abuses.
The Acholi religious, cultural. and local government leaders have advocated for traditionall y-based ritual processes for war-related justice, reconciliation, and reintegration,
particularly mato oput, the ritual climax of an Acholi justice process bringing reconciliation in the wake of a homicide within the community

The Kony War
The Northern Uganda conflict that fina lly spread to the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), Central Africa, and Sudan originated in the margi nalized Acholi
ethnic gro up of Northern Uganda. It offers an ideology that is a cult-like mi shmash of Christianity and traditional mysticism, held together by the force of
Kony ' s charismatic and cruel leadership (Boswell, 2011 ). For more than two
decades, the communities in Acholi, Lango, Teso and West Nile in Northern
Uganda were subjected to the effects of a vio lent conflict between the rebel
movement, the LRA and Ugandan forces. The conflict revolved around access to
state power and resources, with Northerners increasingly being excluded from
national decision and policy making process (The Justice and Reconciliation
Project, 2011 a).
The LRA is a brutal rebel group headed by a messianic madman whose victims are captured boys turned into soldiers, captured girl s forced into sexual slavery and vil lagers put to the machete" Apart from the killings, abductions, rapes
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and sexual enslavement of children, the war created a humanitarian disaster in
the region, with more than a million huddled into the squalor and degradation of
camps (Barney, 2002).
Estimates by human rights groups calculate that at the height ofthe violence,
more than two million people were forcibly relocated to internally displaced persons (lOP) camps, tens of thousands of civilians including men, women, and
children had been abducted and uncounted thousands more killed by the LRA
(Northern Uganda Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG)).
Many villagers suffered from persistent LRA attacks. The people of Uganda
still remember the April 20, 1995, massacre when the LRA, after an intense offensive, defeated the Ugandan army and entered the trading center of Atiak. They
rounded up hundreds of men, women, students and young children and marched
them a short distance into the bush. After being separated according to sex and
age, they were lectured for their alleged collaboration with the government. The
LRA commander in charge ordered his soldiers to open fire three times on a
group of about 300 civilian men and boys as women and young children witnessed the horror and told them to applaud the LRA's work. Youth were forced
to join the LRA to serve as the next generation of combatants and sexual slaves
(JRP 2007b).
On October 9, 1996, 139 girls between the ages of 12 and 15 years were
abducted from St. Mary's College in Aboke, in Northern Uganda. Sister Rachele,
the Italian deputy headmistress, followed the abductors. Her journey took her to
the LRA. She secured the release of the majority of her girls, but she had to leave
behind 30. It is also on record that the Aboke Girls, as they came to be known,
were given to LRA commanders as sex slaves. They were beaten and forced to
become child soldiers, raiding villages and killing wantonly on command. Those
who tried to escape were taken to the camp's execution field to be hacked and
beaten to death by their peers (Can West, 2007).
On October 23 , 2002, an estimated 44 fighters of LRA entered Omot subcounty from Par Samuela Acak near the river Agago with instructions from their
Commander "to abduct whoever they come across until they reached Corner
Gang pa Aculu in Opota Trading Centre" (insert citation here with page number).
The team, consisting mostly of young soldiers, first moved northeast, abducting
12 people in Lawai Ode, an additional eight people in Lalur Onyol and finally
another 12 people were abducted from Latin Ling before they reached the point
of slaughter in a brutal and dehumanizing Omot massacre. People were murdered, cut into pieces and then placed in cooking pots in front of dozens of witnesses (JRP 2010b).
Two years later, the LRA committed one of the largest single massacres during its 26-year insurgency at a quiet displaced person's camp called Barlonyo. In
a space of less than three hours, over 300 people were brutally murdered by LRA
rebels and an unknown number abducted . Camp residents were burned alive
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inside their huts, hacked to death with machetes, stabbed with bayonets, clubbed
with sticks and shot as they fled . The bellies of pregnant women were slit open,
their not-yet-fonned babies thrown into the fires. Others were abducted and
marched north into Acholi-land . Many died in captivity of violence, sickness, or
starvation and the ultimate fate of several abductees remains unknown. It is also
on record that on May 19, 2004, LRA raided the village of Lukodi, and carried
out a massacre that led to the death of over sixty people (JRP, 2009a).
According to the Northern Uganda Transitional Justice Working Group
(TJWG) these actions amount to international war crimes and crimes against
humanity, and do contravene both social values and the laws of Uganda (TJWG,
2011). The United States classifies the LRA as a terrorist organization and in
October 2011 President Barack Obama sent about 100 combat-ready U.S. forces
to help regional governments capture or kill Joseph Kony and his top lieutenants.
The decision to deploy was based on legislation called the Lord ' s Resistance
Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act, passed by Congress in
2010 (Muhumuza, 2012).
The International Criminal Court (ICC) charged Kony and two of his top
lieutenants with crimes again st humanity and would theoretically face trial if
captured alive. However, when the chief prosecutor at the ICC announced its
intention to investigate the LRA in 2004, many local leaders in Northern Uganda
were opposed to the initiative. Traditional, religious and civil society leaders
continue to argue that the ICC places "their" children at greater risk, and threatens to further damage their cultural identity and beliefs. Traditional justice, based
on restorative principles is widely supported as a favorable altemative to the
punitive approach of the Court. A number of advocates, therefore, argue the
Court should cease its current investigation until local approaches are given an
opportunity to work, or until peace is realized in the region.

Talking Peace to the LRA
During the period from 2006 to 2008, the government of Uganda and the LRA
conducted a series of negotiations (the Juba Peace Talks) in the attempt to reach a
peace agreement and to discuss term s of justice and accountability. This Juba
process produced four agreements integral to transitional justice, including comprehensive solutions to the war; accountability and reconciliation; disannament,
demobilization and re integration of anned combatants; and formalization of the
ceasefire (JRP 2006). However, in April 2008, Kony failed to sign the Final
Peace Agreement, an act that led to the eventual collapse of the process.
It is interesti ng to note, however, that Joseph Kony instead sought clarifications on the specificities on the protocol of accountability and reconciliation as
well as the di sannament, demobilization and re-integration agreements. In particular, the LRA leader wanted to know more about the Acholi traditional justice
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system of mato oput, and its linkage to the proposed special division of the High
Court and other formal institutions in the agreements (JRP, 2008a).
Related to this is the famous Lira Declaration signed by cultural and religious
leaders in the sub-regions of West Nile (Madi), Teso, Lango and Acholi, after the
first anniversary of the Juba Peace Talks. It made several recommendations in the
areas of truth, reparations, reconciliation and complementarity. Most importantly
it made a call for traditional justice mechanisms to be used for justice and reconciliation. It said in part,
That traditional approaches to justice and reconciliation in Northern and Eastern Uganda
(malo oput of Acholi, kayo cuk of Iango, ailuc of Teso and tolu koka of Madi, among
others) share similar principles including truth -telling, confession, mediation, and reparation and resulting in reconciliation and the restoration of relations, and that such tradi tional mechanisms are therefore locally and culturally relevant to meet ing the justice
needs of victims of the conflict. (JRP, 2007, p. l2)

On the other hand, the Juba peace process arguably delivered a physical
peace in Uganda. The LRA has not attacked within Uganda since the cessation of
hostilities was signed in 2006. The year 2009 was marked by a significant improvement in the humanitarian situation in Northern Uganda as the region embarked on the long road to recovery from conflict. The security situation improved substantially, allowing thousands of IDPs to return to their original homesteads while many of the displacement camps were demo lished as proof of the
finality of the return process. The determination to return to former homesteads
and rebuild lives and villages stands as a testament to the capacity of those affected by the conflict to persevere amidst challenges such as lacking educational,
health and other social services (JRP, 2009a).
The process, however, is not complete. There is also a handful of activists,
who met in Kampala recently that say the northern civilian population saw serious abuses and violations at the hands of both the LRA and Uganda Peoples Defense Force, and they should be compensated.
Some of the serious abuses stressed include killing, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, abduction, slavery, forced marriage, forced recruitment, mutilation, sexual violence, serious psychological harm, forced di splacement and
looting. The activists want government to compensate the population in terms of
medical, educational, and housing assistance as well as cash, vouchers, pension
or other benefits in monetary value. The Minister of State for Northern Uganda
Rebecca Amuge, who officiated at the meeting, said the victims claim their perpetrators are currently receiving greater packages for reparation than themselves
in the name of amnesty. The chairperson of the Uganda Human Rights Commission, Med Kaggwa, said reparation programs can only succeed if they are linked
with other transitional justice measures particularly prosecution, truth telling and
institutional reforms (UNHCR 20 II).
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There is al so a few other issues to sort out. The explosive weapons planted
during the insurgency are still far from being cleared. The Danish Demining
Group (DDG) in Uganda and Mine Action in south Sudan have revealed that the
two countries ' border areas are still unsafe for human settlement and other activities as they harbor unexploded ordnances. Emmy Katukore, the supervisor of
DOG revealed that so far, they have cleared only 34,255 millimeters, recovering
five anti-personnel mines in the process (Makumbi 20 12).

The First Domestic War Crimes Trial
Thomas Kwoyelo, a former LRA Commander, was arrested by the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) in the DRC in 2009. The Ugandan Department of
Public Prosecutions (DPP) decided to charge Kwoyelo with war crimes under the
Geneva Conventions and with crimes under national law. This was the first case
of the newly created International Crimes Division (JCD) of the Ugandan High
Court. The lCD had been founded in reaction to questions of accountability that
arose during the Juba peace talks between the Government of Uganda (GoU) and
the LRA . At about this time the Ugandan Parliament passed the International
Criminal Court (ICC) Act, which allows the lCD to prosecute Rome Statute
crimes on the domestic level. In short, the lCD referred the Kwoyelo case to the
Constitutional Court when Kwoyelo's defence lawyers protested that he had been
denied under the Amnesty Act. In their view, this constituted a violation of equal
treatment under the Ugandan Constitution. The Constitutional Court decided in
late September 2011 that K woyelo should be eligible for amnesty and ordered the
lCD to cease the case against him .
Even though the case was stopped, Kwoyelo remained in detention. He then
decided to sue the GoU for illegal detention and petitioned the Ugandan High
Court for amnesty on November 23, 2011. The High Court indeed ruled that
Thomas K woyelo should be given amnesty and be set free. The Department of
Public Prosecutions and the Amnesty Commission are the two competent institutions in this case and decided to meet to consult about the Kwoyelo case after the
High Court rul ing. In early February 2012 the Department of Public Prosecutions
again denied amnesty to Thomas Kwoyelo, citing that there can be no amnesty
for charges of war crimes. Thomas Kwoyelo thus remains imprisoned in Luzira
in Kampala to date (Wegner, 20 12).
According to the Justice and Reconciliation Project, "there are several conclusions that can be drawn out of the way this first domestic war crimes trial in
Uganda developed."
First and foremost, the going back and fort h concerning Thomas Kwoyelo' s amnesty underlines that Uganda is at the crossroads with transitional justice. The actions of the DPP
hint at a re-orientation towards more accountability and less amnesty in the future. The
DPP has made that clear by repeatedly denying amnesty to Kwoyelo, despite court or-

36

Journal of Global Initiatives

ders, and by announcing that it has prepared additional cases against former LRA rebels
that it will pursue should Kwoyelo be found guilty. JRP further argues that there is no
explicit government position on how amnesty and prosecution should relate to each other
in the future, and the lack of clarity might we ll spark fears and unrest among LRA returnees. Secondly, the first case of the !CD has arguably also shown that demands for more
positive complementarity, meaning more domestic trials, in ICC cases shou ld be voiced
more carefully. Creating institutions that are legally able to try ICC cases in the situation
cou ntries is an important goal. Yet just creating these institutions is not enough. One has
to ensure th at appropriate laws are in place and that the court is qualified to deal with internation al war crimes cases. (JRP 20 I 0 p. 5)

There was a recent rapid situational analysis carried out by the Justice and
Reconciliation Project between November 28 and December 6, 2011, in the subcounties of Bobbi and Unyama (Gulu district) and Koch Goma (Nwoya district),
and Gulu and Kitgum towns. The objective was to gauge the perceptions and
opinions on amnesty and whether it is still relevant today in post-conflict Northern Uganda. Analysis revealed that an overwhelming majority of the population
still strongly support amnesty and consider it as vitally important for sustainability of the prevailing peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation.
There are divergent opinions among the war-affected people in Northern
Uganda concerning how post-conflict issues of justice and reconciliation should
be handled. Responses gathered by the project camp focal persons from four
community dialogues conducted in Kitgum and Amuru districts in 2008 indicate
that while many people in Northern Uganda are of the view that perpetrators of
war crimes need to be forgiven , a significant majority would also like to see
some form of accountability meted out. While it has always been assumed that
war-affected communities wholeheartedly support the use of local mechanisms
such as mato oput, it is noted that a significant minority have reservations about
the effectiveness and relevance of these mechanisms (JRP, 2008b).

Mato Oput
Mato oput is a long and sophisticated process that begins by separating the affected clans, mediation to establish the "truth" and payment of compensation
according to by-laws. It is both a process and ritual ceremony to restore relationships between clans in the case of intentional murder or an accidental killing.
This process and ceremony is undertaken only in the case of intentional or accidenta l killing of an individual. The ceremony involves two clans bringing together the perpetrator and the victim in a quest for harmony.
Ugandans have had to grapple with the meaning of justice in this context. For
a country with such a troubled history, amnesty has come to be seen as the most
effecti e way of drawing a line between the past and the present in order to rebuild the nation . Uganda's Amnesty Act, introduced six years ago, provides a
legal framework for this. It recognizes traditional justice mechanisms like mato
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oput which is bitter drink well known by the Acholi people of Northern Ugandan
that may have the ingredients for peace between the Ugandan government and
the rebel LRA as well as promoting community reconciliation.

Acholi Traditions
Acholi tradition embodies the principles and practices which have been central to
the support for reconciliation and amnesty within that community. Through the
mediation of the traditional chiefs (rwodi) many offences, including homicides,
have traditionally been resolved by reconciliation. Whenever a homicide takes
place the rwod i intervene in the situation to "cool down the temperature" and to
offer mediation. Although the traditional chiefs had since 1911 been supplanted
by the colonially appointed chiefs (Rwodi Ka1am), their legitimacy has never
been destroyed . The 1995 Constitution, which allowed for traditional or cultural
leaders to exist in any part of Uganda, has led to the revival and celebration of
cultural and traditional institutions in all parts of the country. Today, in a project
supported by the Belgian government, the rwodi of all the Acholi clans have been
reinstated and the Lawi Rwodi (head chief) has been elected by the other rwodi .
After years of conflict and marginalization, the chiefs, like most of their people,
are poor and royal houses are in need of repair. However, the greatest asset of the
chiefs-their political independence-gives them enhanced credibility in mediating reconciliation (Barney, 2002) .
The unique contribution of the rwodi is through their mediation of the reconciliation process, mato oput, which many Acholi believe can bring true healing in
a way that a formal justice system cannot. This ceremony of clan and familycentered reconciliation incorporates the acknowledgement of wrongdoing, the
offering of compensation by the offender and then culminates in the sharing of
symbolic drink. Early in November 2001 , a group mato oput ceremony was held
in Pajule. This involved about 20 recently returned LRA combatants and included many others who had already settled in the community. The ceremony was
supported by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), churches and by Acholi
in the diaspora. Government officials, the amnesty commissioners, senior army
commanders in the region and several representatives of NGOs attended the
function , demonstrating the support of the wider Ugandan community. Another
ceremony has taken place in Pabbo, in the Gulu district, and others are planned
for different parts of Acholi.
In addition to mato oput, individual cleansing rituals routinely take place
whenever former LRA members return to the community. Most agencies that
receive and reintegrate ex-combatants ensure that traditional rituals are integrated
into the process. In a demonstration of the value attached to traditional approaches locally, in Kitgum the district earmarked some funds for elders to carry out
atonement rituals. The Amnesty Act enjoins the Amnesty Commission to "pro-
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mote appropriate mechanisms of reconciliation in the affected areas and the
Commission has been supportive of the initiatives in Acholi. Although all these
efforts have contributed to a successful reintegration process it is difficult to attribute specific effects to each element" (Barney, 2002, p.34).
In Acholi, mato oput is performed after a mediated process has brought together two families and clans. The offender accepts responsibility, asks for forgiveness and must make reparation to the victims. The perpetrator and the victim ' s family then share the root drink from a calabash, to recall and bury the
bitterness ofthe soured relations (Okello, 2002).
Another Acholi ritual, gomo tong-the bending of spears-symbolizes the
ending of hostilities between groups and is also preceded by discu ssion and truthtelling. Other cleansing rituals are already used to welcome fann er LRA combatants into the communities. This option, however, is threatened by the war crime
indictments issued by the ICC for four senior LRA commanders.

Challenges to Mato Oput as a Method of Conflict Management
The perception of whether justice has been served or injustices committed in the
course of a war is a judgment that follows from two possible lines of assessment.
First, opinions are fanned on the general accounts of the conduct of the conflict
and a verdict is passed. Second, individual acts or events in the course of the war
need to be considered, and give separate judgments of their just or unjust characteristics. It ought not to be an "either-or" judgment that glosses over complex
and serious issues that demand careful consideration . Mato oput and partial ICC
indictments of the LRA suffer from such generalization and limited focus to a
truncated period of the conflict. It is partly for this reason that mato oput-the
Acholi traditional practice of conflict resolution-has been criticized in Northern
Uganda (see also Pillar, 1988).
Mato oput as a model for war termination makes no distinction between degree of gravity of crimes and categories of responsibi lity of perpetratorsabducted children and those who abducted, trained and deployed them and the
crimes they committed . The principle of retributive justice demands that there
must be proportionality; that is, the punishment must be commensurate with the
crime.
War crimes, crimes against humanity are committed against individuals as
subjects of human rights discourses. By overemphasizing the fears, misery and
psychological trauma of a collective, faceless, nameless mass of Acholi survivors
and their wish for a quick fix, focus is removed from the necessity of exacting
justice also for those who died horrible deaths because of abuses. Adopting this
approach obscures the ultimate objective of war and war tennination: the vindication of human rights by punishing unjustifiable abuses committed in the conduct and duration of the conflict (see also Waltzer, 2000).
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Mato oput and supplemental state or ICC special cou1ts try only alleged LRA
perpetrators and this biases the whole process of mato oput as a war termination
model to favor the ethics of national security against ethics of human security. In
effect, we would not be punishing the LRA for crimes committed against Northern Ugandan non-combatants, for which the National Resistance Army/Uganda
Peoples Defense Forces (NRAIUPDF) are equally culpable, but for crimes
against the Ugandan state. Therefore, mato oput as a war termination model that
lays claims to justice and equity would not be ensuring equal justice but abetting
a possible NRA/UPDF victor' s justice, ajustice girdled by political expediency.
In the just war tradition, no peace can come out of an unjust war. And a just
peace cannot prevail if war termination rules are dictated by assumed victorious
NRA which waged a war in violation of other' s rights in the first place. Lives,
property and security have been destroyed through vindictive, politically motivated counterinsurgency strategies. The defeat of violators or their punishment is
the only means to vindicate those rights, and mato oput as a model seems inadequate to make these transcending moral and political arguments. In ending the
Northern Uganda war, we must not only concern ourselves with what can be
done but also what ought to be done, a proposition that mato oput as a model for
war termination is incapable of making. In other words, justice of the ends and
justice of the means of war must be central to the contemplation of a just peace at
the end of the Northern Uganda war (Okello, 2002).
For a just peace to be concluded, judgments about motives of the war and
how the war was conducted and ended are critical. The most important goal at
the end of a conflict is the securing of human rights and a just peace. On the
scales of the principles of the just war tradition of Aquinas, Grotius, Augustine
and their followers, both the LRA and the Uganda government's motives and
means used in prosecuting the Northern war cannot be morally justified. This
would still be the case even if we allowed for the accepted contradictions in the
just war tradition that lives may have to be destroyed in order to save other lives,
and that sometimes destructive war is a necessary evil in the defense of certain
values that constitute fundamental social and moral mainstay of society (Okello,
2002).
lrin ' s (20 10) report, When the traditional practice of Malo Oput comes into
play, states that mato oput is "a traditional process of justice that aims to foster
reconciliation after a killing" (page). Most often this involves two clans-the
clan of the "aggressor" and the clan of the "survivor"--coming together with
reconciliation as their aim.
The process is broken into a few specific steps:
I.
2.

The aggressor confesses their wrongdoings-specifically naming the crimes
they have committed and those they have killed .
The clan of the aggressor and the clan of the survivor come to an agreement
regarding compensation for the harm that has been done.
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3.

The two clans perform rituals which symbolize that an agreement has been
reached .

To apply mato oput and partial ICC indictments to end the Northern Uganda
conflict and as a basis for a just peace, is tantamount to consciously promoting
impunity and acquiescing in state-led propaganda that seeks to absolve the
Ugandan state from responsibility to protect (R2P), and its own unjustifiable
counterinsurgency strategies that, like the LRA 's insurgency methods, victimized
unarmed women and children and targeted entire ethnic gro up for collective punishment in order to discourage support for insurgency. We are familiar with Amnesty International's and Human Rights Watch 's documented cases of rape, sodomy, extrajudicial killings, forced displacements and forcible recruitment into
both rebel and government paramilitaries and militias by both sides. It is not
coincidental that the LRA and the Ugandan state both are strident proponents of
mato oput; this is not because of any real possibility for truth-telling, but a means
for escaping accountability and punishment for their criminal motives, behaviour
and actions in the war (Otunnu, 2006, p 2).
Proponents of mato oput fail to appreciate the facts that war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide committed in Northern Uganda center around
issues of the exercise of state power, human rights, and those who claim to have
picked up arms to defend themselves or have challenged th e legiti macy and powers of an unjust state.
Obviously, the state and human rights are subjects of both mun icipal law and
public international law, but specifically, the individual is the subject of international humanitarian and human rights laws. Therefore, war crimes, crimes against
humanity and genocide, are international crimes that mu st be subjected to the
exigencies of international norms, justice and appropriate puni shment without
exception. The Northern insurgency, which was originally organized around
Acholi factions of remnants of a former national army, was a contestation of state
power and response to perceived persecution by the state.
Over the years, it permutated to co-opt regional and geopolitical dimensions
of politics, ideology, natural resource economics and other aspects of strategic
international calculation that had nothing to do with Acholi grievances or internal
Uganda national politics. Consequently, its termination and equitable resolution
cannot be adequately captured by Acholi traditional or cultural jurisprudence as a
war termination model that ought to address outstanding grievances and issues in
order for a just and durable peace to be established by the termination of the conflict.
In any case, the model of mato oput popularized by its varying local and
international proponents is a bastardized form and convoluted concept of classical Acholi mato oput. First, the practice was only relevant in inadvertent commission of grievous harm, manslaughter between familie s, clans, and villages,
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but never between Acholi and non-Acholi commumttes. Second, in classical
Acholi practice, inter-tribal and inter-chiefdom conflicts, killings and grievances
were evaluated on lapii or casas belli, which gave rise to a just ad bellum or the
moral justification for a war of revenge. The defeat of or suit for peace by the
perpetrators, leading to culu kwor, or proportionate indemnity or punishment, led
to a settlement that ended with gomo tong or bending of spears by both sides to
signify conflict termination, but never mato oput, which was inter-family, interclan and an intra-Acholi practice for accidental harm.
Therefore, the Lord ' s Resistance Movement/Army and the National Resistance Movement/ Anny conflicts, as deliberate acts of abuses, do not qualify
for mato opu ; indeed, mato oput' s assumed social, psychological and metaphysical potency could not be thought to be of any value in remediation of rights abuses including unj ustified killings in or outside Acholi. In other words, mato oput is
a poor substitute for a robust, aggressive and vigorous application of international
humanitarian and human rights laws to vindicate the human rights of the people
ofNorthern Uganda and provide a basis for a just peace (Okello, 2002).
For the purpose of argument, mato oput is considered without any practical
merits in extra-Achol i conflict context. Despite its moral relativism, the practice
has attracted strident interlocutors, some with compassionate merits, but most
with indefensible positions rely ing on faith , speculation and deliberate unwillingness to look at the history and facts of the conflicts to infonn the best framework
for termination and a j ust peace.
Under the purview of the just war tradition, a war of liberation or one fought
in defense of human rights must not cause more harm, deaths and misery on the
people in whose name it is fought. This is to ensure that no unjustifiable killings
and abuses are perpetrated under the cover of a just war. As a key test for justice,
in the course of the war or at the end of it, we must not be left worse off by the
outcomes of the war than we were under prior and prevailing alleged unjust conditions the war sought to right. In the case of Northern Uganda, there is no debate
about how doubly worse off we are, and none of the belligerents on either side of
the war comes out of this unscathed as vindicators of human rights. In other
words, no persuasive case can be made, particularly in defense of the Ugandan
state that war was the last resort and the least of several more devious and immoral courses of action that would have harmed more than protected social and
economic infrastructures and the fundamental rights of the people who have suffered in Northern and Eastern Uganda.
For many, mato oput has resulted in successful reintegration into their communities, but the road to complete healing and forgiveness can be long. As stated
in the Irin (2 0 10) report, Kenneth Oketta, prime minister of the Acholi Cultural
Authority, supports the practice, saying, " . .. without this process there is no healing. We need to move forward" (p.23).
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Conclusion
The fact that the alleged offenders prefer it, the victims ask for it and the alternative is ill equipped to do the opposite, we could safely conclude that to date the
most suited approach in this particular case is the traditional approach. Local and
rudimentary it may be in the eyes of many, mato oput has embedded in it all the
internationally acclaimed components of justice: truth telling, acknowledgement
and reparation. Besides, in this case one cannot met out punishment to the offending party without getting at the victim. Mato oput should at least in the short
run be left to take the day. This is in tandem with Rosenberg (1999) that " ... a
country's decisions about how to deal with its past should depend on many
things: the type of war endured, the type of crimes committed, the level of societal complicity, the nation ' s political culture and history" (p.S).
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